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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
situation has been well summarized by the Supreme Court of Kansas: "The
doctrine is a rule of law, but the facts to which it applies must be found by
the jury." Tartar v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Go. (1925) 119 Kan.
365, 239 Pac. 754.
Under the peculiar situation existing in the instant case where there was
conflicting testimony as to the existence of the facts necessary to impose the
duty of watchfulness, it is proper to say that there must be a finding by the
jury as to the facts which existed at the time. But this finding should not
be obtained by submitting the bare question of the presence of the duty to
the jury, but rather by instructing them that they must find certain specific
facts to have existed before they can apply the instruction based upon the
humanitarian doctrine. Any other ruling will result in the courts still
further weakening their slight control over the actions of juries in personal
injury cases. G. W. S., '33.
NEGIaGENCE--PROXIMATE CAUSE-SPREADING FIREs.-In line with its tra-
ditional practical viewpoint, the Court of Appeals of New York early
adopted a strict attitude toward liability for the spread of fire negligently
set, applying a closer test of proximate causation than any other jurisdic-
tion. The case of Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co. (1866) 35 N. Y.
210, is a forerunner of the ultimate New York position. In that case the de-
fendant railroad company negligently set fire to one of its sheds, the flames
spreading to and destroying the house of the plaintiff, situated upon adjoin-
ing land, 130 feet distant from the sheds. The court, in declaring that there
was no cause of action, used language significant in understanding the
present unique New York position upon the point: "Each man, in a com-
mercial community, runs the hazard of his neighbor's conduct, and each, by
insurance against such hazards, is enabled to obtain a reasonable security
against loss. To neglect such precaution and to call upon his neighbor upon
whose premises a fire originated to indemnify him instead, would be to award
a punishment quite beyond the offense committed." The decision also
pointed out that the principle of subrogation would entitle insurance com-
panies to the benefit of all claims of insured property owners, a situation
which, in an extensive fire, would produce claims beyond possibility of ade-
quate payment, at least without the bankruptcy of the merely negligent
offender.
The ultimate New York rule, however, is somewhat less stringent than
the doctrine of the Ryan case. It was laid down definitely in Hoffman v.
King (1899) 160 N. Y. 618, 55 N. E. 401. Under it the negligent fire is the
proximate cause only of damage to property immediately adjoining the
premises of the defendant, with no liability for the results of the fire's
spreading across intervening lands to lands not adjoining. Moore v. Van
Beuran (1925) 240 N. Y. 673, 148 N. E. 753; Rose v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co. (1923) 236 N. Y. 568, 142 N. E. 287; Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.
(1928) 247 N. Y. 160, 59 N. E. 896; Daugherty v. King (1901) 165 N. Y. 657,
59 N. E. 1121.
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A problem testing the integrity of the New York doctrine arose in Homac
Corporation v. Sun Oil Co. (1932) 258 N. Y. 462, 180 N. E. 172. Plaintiff
corporation owned buildings in the city of Syracuse, situated diagonally
across a 66 foot street from the defendant's storage tanks. Title to the
soil of the street was in the city of Syracuse. Fire started in one of the
tanks through negligence of the defendant, and sparks, flames, or intense
heat ignited one of plaintiff's buildings across the street, from which the
fire was communicated to others, causing their destruction. The defendant
appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and its insurance car-
riers, contending that under the established rule of the State its negligence
was not the proximate cause of damage to other than abutting owners. It
was held that since the bare street, no part of which was touched by fire,
provided no element of causation, the defendant's fire might be said to "im-
mediately precede" the plaintiff's fire and that liability might properly
attach.
The same result would have been reached in any other jurisdiction with-
out difficulty. The prevailing view, both in this country and in England,
disregards the space limitation entirely, imposing upon a person who negli-
gently sets a fire liability for all damages proximately caused thereby, with-
out regard to whether the fire passes across the land of intervening owners
before causing damage to the plaintiff. Smith v. London & S. W. Ry. Co.
(1870) L. R. 6 C. P. 14; Small v. C., R. I., & P. R. Co. (1881) 55 Iowa 582,
8 N. W. 437; Atch., T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stanford (1874) 12 Kan. 354; P. W.
& B. R. R. Co. v. Constable (1873) 39 Md. 149; Fent v. T., P. & W. Ry. Co.
(1867) 59 Ill. 349; Perley v. Eastern Railroad Co. (1868) 98 Mass. 414;
D. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Salmon (1877) 39 N. J. L. 299; P. R. R. Co. v. Hope
(1876) 80 Pa. 373; Kellog v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1870) 26 Wis. 223;
E. T., V. & G. R. Co. v. Hesters (1892) 90 Ga. 11, 15 S. E. 828.
The leading Missouri case upon the question of spreading fires is strik-
ingly opposed to the New York position. In Poeppers v. M. K. & T. R. Co.
(1878) 67 Mo. 715, liability was imposed upon a railroad, a locomotive of
which had negligently ignited dried weeds upon its right of way, even though
the spreading fire, over a period of more than 24 hours, traveled eight miles
across the premises of several intervening landowners before causing dam-
age to plaintiff's buildings. Other Missouri cases are in accord: High-
tower v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (1878) 67 Mo. 726; Wise v. Joplin Railroad Co.
(1884) 85 Mo. 178.
In a rather recent case, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals refused to
apply the New York space limitation of liability to a controversy arising in
that state upon the ground that the state decisions do not establish a "rule
of property" binding on the Federal Court. Although fire had spread 2,000
feet and across lands of two intervening proprietors, the defendant's lia-
bility was enforced. Cole v. P. R. R. Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 953.
It seems probable that this decision will result in an endeavor by future
plaintiffs to invoke the Federal jurisdiction wherever possible, the cases be-
ing largely brought against railroads. H. W. J., '34.
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